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ARTICLES
IMPLICATIONS OF THE COMING RETREAT
FROM ROE V. WADE*
Charles F. Rice**
In Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,'
the Supreme Court held unconstitutional Pennsylvania statutes which re-
quired that (1) pregnant women give "informed consent" to an abortion and
that they be provided information as to the characteristics of their unborn
child, the nature and risks of abortion and the availability of alternatives to
abortion;' (2) the attending physician must file detailed reports on abortions
and the reports be made available to the public for copying, even though this
could lead to public identification of the woman having the abortion;3
(3) that in post-viability abortions, the physician use the care and techniques
that would provide the best opportunity for the unborn child to be aborted
alive unless ... that technique would present a significantly greater medical
risk to the life or health of the pregnant woman;4 and (4) a second physician
be present during an abortion involving a potentially viable fetus.5
The vote in Thornburgh was 5-4, with Chief Justice Burger, who had
voted with the 7-2 majority in Roe v. Wade 6 dissenting. The division of the
Court in the Thornburgh vote indicates that, with further appointments or a
change in view on the part of sitting Justices, the Court may well alter its
view on abortion.
In response to the Thornburgh ruling, Eleanor Smeal, former president of
* A substantial part of this essay derives from a Brendan Brown lecture delivered by
Professor Rice on September 25, 1986 at The Catholic University of America, Columbus
School of Law.
** College of The Holy Cross, A.B., Boston College, LL.B.; New York University,
LL.M., J.S.D.; Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame.
1. 106A S. Ct. 2169 (1986).
2. Id. at 2178-79.
3. Id. at 2181-82.
4. Id. at 2183.
5. The Court held that these provisions were unconstitutional, because they lacked the
necessary exception for an emergency. Id. at 2183-84.
6. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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the National Organization for Women, said the decision "can be interpreted
to read that the women of the United States are now just one vote away from
losing the rights they worked so hard to win."7 Opponents of abortion
agreed that the closeness of the Thornburgh vote indicates that the decision
of Roe v. Wade is likely to be overturned in the near future. "I have always
felt that a constitutional amendment was the only way to reverse
Roe,"8 commented Congressman Henry Hyde (R. Ill.). "As the court ma-
tures in its thinking," he continued, "and begins to digest the national expe-
rience of 1.5 million abortions a year, the numbers are getting closer. Which
will come first-a constitutional amendment or a new justice? I think a new
justice."9
The fears and hopes of both sides as to the future of Roe v. Wade appear
to be overdrawn. While it is fair to expect a change in the attitude of the
Court toward legalized abortion, an examination of the basic premises of the
Roe and Thornburgh decisions indicate that whatever change does occur will
be less than fundamental.
In Roe v. Wadeo and the companion case of Doe v. Bolton ", the Court
said that it would not decide whether an unborn child is a living human
being. Rather, the Court ruled that, whether or not he is a human being, the
unborn child is not a person, since "the word person,' as used in the Four-
teenth Amendment [sic], does not include the unborn." 2 Thus, the Court
effectively concluded that an acknowledged human being is a non-person.
In Roe, the right to life of the unborn child was asserted against the
mother's right to privacy. As between those two rights, the right to life is
clearly superior. The Court acknowledged this in a note, indicating that if
the personhood of the unborn child was established, abortion would not be
permitted even to save the life of the mother.' 3 The Court candidly stated
that if personhood were established, the case for legalized abortion "col-
lapses." 14 But since the Court ruled that the unborn child, whether or not
he is a human being, is not a person, he therefore has no rights.
The only right remaining is the mother's right to privacy. While the Court
asserted that this right is not absolute'", it was defined so as to permit, in
effect, elective abortion at every stage of pregnancy to the time of normal
7. Chicago Tribune, June 15, 1986, § 5, at 1, col. 1.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
11. Id. at 179.
12. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 158 (1973).
13. Id. at 157 n.54.
14. Id. at 156-57.
15. Id. at 155.
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delivery. According to Roe, after viability, the state may regulate abortion
and may even prohibit it, "except where it is necessary, in appropriate medi-
cal judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother."6 The
health of the mother, however, includes psychological as well as physical
well-being. Thus in Doe v. Bolton, the Court said that "the medical judgment
may be exercised in the light of all factors-physical, emotional, psychologi-
cal, familial, and the woman's age-relevant to the well-being of the
mother." 17 Consequently, these loose criteria are equivalent to a sanction
for permissive abortion.
Since 1973, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed the basic principle of Roe v.
Wade in various applications.' 8 Although an analysis of these cases is be-
yond the scope of this article, their net effect is to confirm the present dispo-
sition of the Court, as in Thornburgh, to invalidate all state prohibitions, and
even to invalidate most state regulations of abortion at any stage of
pregnancy.
The crucial issue, however, is personhood. In a constitutional system in
which personhood is a precondition for possessing constitutional rights, is
there an inseparable coniection between humanity and personhood? Must
all human beings be regarded as persons, or may some human beings be
excluded from the category of persons so as to be deprived of constitutional
rights, including even the right to live? This article is not concerned with the
ability of competent adults to waive the rights derived from personhood,
including the waiver implied in the commission of a crime. Rather, the
question is whether an innocent human being may be deprived of per-
sonhood, without his consent, so as to be subject to execution at the discre-
tion of others. To the extent that one is subject to such execution, he is a
non-person. That is why, as noted below, Justice Stevens stated in his
Thornburgh opinion that if the unborn child is a person, his life cannot be at
the disposal of the legislature.' 9
There is no reasonable basis, despite Thornburgh, to conclude that the
Court is likely to reverse Roe on the crucial holding that the unborn child is
not a person. None of the dissenters in Thornburgh disagreed with the ma-
jority on the personhood issue. Chief Justice Burger, who had voted with
16. Id. at 165.
17. 410 U.S. at 192.
18. See, e.g. Simopoulos v. Virginia, 462 U.S. 506 (1983); Planned Parenthood Ass'n of
Kansas City v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Colautti
v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977); Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Sendak v. Arnold, 429 U.S. 968 (1976); and Connecticut v.
Menillo, 423 U.S. 9 (1975).
19. Thornburgh, 106A S. Ct. at 2188 (Stevens, J., concurring.)
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the majority in Roe, dissented in Thornburgh because he concluded that the
Thornburgh ruling "plainly undermines.. .[the] important principle" of Roe
that "the right to an abortion, is not unqualified and must be considered
against important state interests in regulation."2 The Chief Justice, how-
ever, did not abandon his view that the Constitution guarantees a qualified
right to an abortion.2' Similarly, Justice White, joined by Justice Rehnquist,
in his dissent stated:
I can certainly agree with the proposition-which I deem indisputa-
ble-that a woman's ability to choose an abortion is a species of "lib-
erty" that is subject to the general protections of the Due Process
Clause. I cannot agree, however, that this liberty is so fundamen-
tal that restrictions upon it call into play anything more than the
most minimal scrutiny.22
Justice White indicated that he would uphold even some state prohibitions
of abortion and he opted for "overruling" Roe v. Wade. He stated:
[b]oth the characterization of the abortion liberty as fundamental
and the denigration of the State's interest in preserving the lives of
nonviable fetuses are essential to the detailed set of constitutional
rules devised by the Court to limit the States' power to regulate
abortion. If either or both of these facets of Roe v. Wade were
rejected, a broad range of limitations on abortion (including out-
right prohibition) that are now unavailable to the States would
again become constitutional possibilities.
In my view, such a state of affairs would be highly desirable
from the standpoint of the Constitution. Abortion is a hotly con-
tested moral and political issue. Such issues, in our society, are to
be resolved by the will of the people, either as expressed through
legislation or through the general principles they have already in-
corporated into the Constitution they have adopted. Roe v. Wade
implies that the people have already resolved the debate by weav-
ing into the Constitution the values and principles that answer the
issue. As I have argued, I believe it is clear that the people have
never - not in 1787, 1791, 1868, or at any time since - done any
such thing. I would return the issue to the people by overruling
Roe v. Wade.23
Justice White, however, did not challenge the basic holding of Roe that
the unborn child is not a person. His evident preference is for the states'
rights solution that would permit the legislature of each state to allow or
20. Id. at 2190 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 2194 (White, J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 2197-98 (White, J., dissenting).
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prohibit abortion. As noted by Justice Stevens in his concurrence, this ap-
proach implicitly rejects the personhood of the unborn child.24
In a dissent joined by Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor did not chal-
lenge the principle that the unborn child is a nonperson. Instead, she criti-
cized the majority on the ground that it:
appears to adopt as its new test a per se rule under which any regu-
lation touching on abortion must be invalidated if it poses "an un-
acceptable danger of deterring the exercise of that right." Under
this prophylactic test, it seems that the mere possibility that some
women will be less likely to choose to have an abortion by virtue of
the presence of a particular state regulation suffices to invalidate
it.
25
In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens emphasized the centrality of the
personhood issue by stating:
[f]or, unless the religious view that a fetus is a person' is adopted-a
view Justice White refuses to embrace-there is a fundamental and
well-recognized difference between a fetus and a human being; in-
deed, if there is not such a difference, the permissibility of termi-
nating the life of a fetus could scarcely be left to the will of the state
legislatures.26
In a footnote to this statement, Justice Stevens observed that, "[n]o member
of this Court has ever suggested that a fetus is a person' within the meaning
of the Fourteenth Amendment.,
27
At the time of the Thornburgh decision, therefore, there was not one vote
on the Court in favor of overruling Roe on its crucial personhood ruling.
This was true despite Justice White's description of his proposed limitation
of Roe.28 Whatever the view adopted by the newly appointed Justices
Antonin Scalia and Anthony Kennedy, there is no indication that the Court
will overrule Roe on this point. One future prospect, however, would be the
allowance by the Court of some more effective restrictions, and perhaps even
prohibitions, of abortion by the states and Congress. The fulcrum of the
controversy would then be shifted to the state legislatures and to Congress.
If this were to occur, litigation would surely follow to test the type and scope
of restrictions which the Supreme Court would tolerate. However, the issue
of abortion would be complicated by the use of state constitutional provi-
sions or statutes which provide greater protection to the right to privacy
24. Id. at 2188 (Stevens, J., concurring).
25. Id. at 2214 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 2188 (Stevens, J., concurring).
27. Id. at 2188 n.8 (Stevens, J., concurring).
28. Id. at 2198 (White, J., dissenting).
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than currently required by the Supreme Court. "Already, the decisions of
the Massachusetts, New Jersey, and California High Courts can be read to
establish a state constitutional right to abortion which would survive Roe's
demise."29
The limited retreat from Roe apparently favored by Justice White and
others would result in a patchwork of permissive and restrictive statutes on
the abortion issue. It is likely, too, that such a compromise would only post-
pone the necessity of a judicial resolution of the personhood question.
If a state tribunal, such as the Montana or Louisiana Supreme
Court, were to set aside an anti-abortion law because it violated a
woman's state constitutional privacy right, the only remaining fed-
eral "pro-life" judicial option would be to urge the United States
Supreme Court to hold that the federal constitution somehow pro-
tects the life of a fetus, the laws of Congress and the states
notwithstanding.
Perhaps in the end this anticipated swirl of state and federal ac-
tion would place the abortion issue back in the laps of nine life-
tenured federal Justices. If so, the Court would be forced to face
the formidable question: Are fetuses persons in the legal sense that
they are entitled to the basic safeguards provided by the supreme
law of the land? If the Court were to answer that question in the
affirmative, such a ruling would place the abortion question beyond
lawmakers' reach. Only a constitutional amendment could then
revive the right cherished by many feminists.3
Another alternative is for Congress to enact a "Human Life Statute" de-
fining the unborn child as a person. 3' In Katzenbach v. Morgan,32 Justice
Brennan enunciated the "ratchet theory" recognizing Congress' authority to
secure fourteenth amendment guarantees through Section 5 of that amend-
ment.33 However, the Court also explained that:
[Section] 5 does not grant Congress power to exercise discretion in
the other direction and to enact statutes so as in effect to dilute
equal protection and due process decisions of this Court.' We em-
phasize that Congress' power under Section 5 is limited to adopt-
ing measures to enforce the guarantees of the Amendment; Section
5 grants Congress no power to restrict, abrogate, or dilute these
guarantees. Thus, for example, an enactment authorizing the
29. Collins, Is There "Life" (or "Choice") after Roe?, 3 CONST. COMMENTARY 91, 95 n.9
(1986).
30. Id.
31. See Galeback, A Human Life Statute, 7 HuM. LIFE REV. 5 (1981).
32. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
33. Id. at 650-51.
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States to establish racially segregated systems of education would
not be-as required by [Section] 5-a measure to enforce' the
Equal Protection Clause since that clause of its own force prohibits
such state laws.34
This "ratchet theory", however, would make Congress merely an imple-
menting agent for Supreme Court decisions. To ascribe such an intent to the
legislators is unwarranted. Regardless, the pronouncement of the "ratchet
theory" by Justice Brennan in the Morgan case was dictum since it was not
necessarily essential to the decision of that case. But even if such a doctrine
were enunciated by the Supreme Court as a specific holding, fidelity to the
meaning of the fourteenth amendment would justify Congress in rejecting it
as a self-serving attempt to establish a theory of judicial supremacy which is
inconsistent with the intent of that amendment.
In any event, there is no reasonable prospect in the near future that Con-
gress will enact a statute defining the unborn child as a person. If such a
statute were enacted, it would, of course, eventually go before the Supreme
Court for a decision as to its constitutionality. It is much more likely that
the personhood issue will find its way to the Supreme Court by way of litiga-
tion arising out of state legislation.
. A states' rights approach to abortion is premised on the concept of the
non-personhood of the unborn child. Therefore, it is unlikely that a
Supreme Court which has adopted this states' rights solution would repudi-
ate it by conferring upon the unborn a personhood requiring the prohibition
by the states of abortion in all cases. Unless a major reconstruction or re-
alignment of the Court intervenes, the Court will likely decline the invitation
to extend personhood to the unborn and will uphold the states' rights solu-
tion. While this would confirm the non-personhood of the unborn, its allow-
ance of some restraints on abortion would be widely regarded by many as a
victory for the pro-life cause. Such a "victory," however, would have deeper
and disturbing implications.
The adoption in American law of the "positivist principle" that some
human beings can be decreed to be non-persons so as to be subject to death
at the discretion of others, threatens not only the unborn but also the re-
tarded, the incurably ill, the senile and other dependent classes of what the
Nazis called "useless eaters."35 Even if the Supreme Court allows the states
to extend some protection to the unborn child, stopping short of affirming
his personhood and consequent immunity to execution at the discretion of
34. Id. at 651 n.10.
35. See Affidavit of Defendant Brock, Tricks of War Criminals Before the Nuremburg
Military Tribunals, Vol. I, ("The Medical Case") 844. See also C. RICE, THE VANISHING
RIGHT To LIVE 61-66 (1969).
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others, it will have implicitly rejected the necessary correspondence in a par-
tial repeal of Roe that would save the lives of some unborn children, thus
dissolving the basic protection of personhood with respect to all human
beings.
The denial of personhood to some human beings must inevitably lead to a
loss of respect for the sanctity of life in general. If the unborn child can be
defined as a non-person, there would be no reason why his retarded brother
and his grandmother might not be subjected to similar treatment. In the
face of the demographic pressures toward euthanasia, as discussed below,
and in the face of the privatization of abortion by early-abortifacient technol-
ogy, it is predictable that an affirmation of non-personhood for the unborn,
even in the context of a "repeal" of Roe, could lead to the killing of human
beings of all ages on a scale larger than we have yet experienced.
The restoration of personhood could be particularly important to the un-
born child in light of technological changes that have made early abortions
by pill a reality.36 The recognition of the unborn child as a person whose life
must be protected by the law could be essential for a recognition of the valid-
ity of state prohibitions and regulation of drugs or devices that have no func-
tion other than the abortifacient.
In the coming era of privatized "abortion-by-pill" and privatized euthana-
sia by non-treatment and starvation, the disputes concerning exceptions to
such practices will lose their importance. The major legislative control on
early abortions will be in some form of licensing prohibiting substances and
devices solely used for abortifacient purposes. There would also be regula-
tion of the distribution of those substances and devices that have multiple
purposes. As to private abortion and private euthanasia, the main safeguard
for innocent life will be the restoration of the conviction among the Ameri-
can people that life is precious because it is the gift of God. The law could
have an important educative effect, but only to the extent that it proclaims,
without compromise, the sanctity of life and the personhood of all human
beings without regard to age or ability.
At the risk of being misunderstood, I suggest that the advantage to be
gained by a replacement of Roe v. Wade by a states' rights regime would be
trivial. Surely many lives of unborn children would be saved in the states
that would choose to restrict abortion. And I do not imply that to save even
one life is trivial. Each life is precious and unique and we must do what we
can to save lives, whether under Roe, a states' rights regime or any other
arrangement. But in a wider perspective, the adoption of a states' rights
36. For a discussion of the anti-progesterone pill, RU-486, see Washington Times, Jan. 22,
1986, at 2A, col. 2.
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solution would so undermine American law that it would potentially jeop-
ardize the lives of all and not merely the lives of the unborn. In any event, it
is wrong to concede the legitimacy of the murder of Able in order to save
Baker. Such a concession underlies the states' rights approach. It is wrong,
in principle as well as in pragmatics, to attempt to save Able by accepting a
depersonalization principle that subjects to forfeiture, at the decree of the
majority, the lives of Baker, Charlie, Delta and every other human being.
Perhaps the main source of confusion with respect to the impending re-
treat from Roe is the tendency to view legalized abortion as the problem
rather than a symptom of more basic ills. In fact, legalized abortion is a
symptom of the general acceptance in American society of secularism, rela-
tivism (with its offspring, legal positivism) and the contraceptive ethic.
Abortion is a symptom of secularism. The establishment clause of the first
amendment was intended to require Congress to maintain neutrality among
religious sects. It was not intended to prevent government from acknowl-
edging God and from promoting prayers and a recognition of His law."
Since 1961, however, the Supreme Court has imposed on the states as well as
on the federal government, a requirement of neutrality, not only among reli-
gious sects, but also between theism and non-theism.3" Thus, government is
required to suspend judgment on the very question of the existence of God.
It is now unconstitutional, according to the theory of the Supreme Court, for
the President to affirm officially that the Declaration of Independence is in
fact true when it proclaims the existence of "Nature's God," the "Creator,"
the "supreme Judge of the world" and the "Divine Providence." These
words may be recited only as a historical commemoration without any affir-
mation that they are in fact true.3 9 Government can neither affirm nor deny
the existence of God. But when government suspends judgment on the
existence of God, it gives implicit preference to agnosticism.
The Declaration of Independence recognized "the laws of nature and of
nature's God"' and affirmed that "all men... are endowed by their Creator
with certain inalienable rights."4' Therefore, there are, God-given limits
which no government can rightly exceed. The Supreme Court's false neu-
trality, however, implicitly rejects the natural moral law as a limit on gov-
ernment action. This preference for an agnostic secularism requires that the
37. See generally R. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (1982); C. RICE, THE
SUPREME COURT AND PUBLIC PRAYER (1964).
38. See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421 (1962); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
39. See Abington School Dist., 374 U.S. at 304 (Brennan, J., concurring).
40. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
41. Id. at para. 2.
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right to life of the unborn child, his elder, retarded brother and his grand-
mother must be evaluated in secular, utilitarian terms. In that context, the
odds are heavily against the "unwanted."
Legalized abortion is also a symptom of relativism, which denies that
there is an objective moral law derived from the unchanging nature of man
known through reason and revelation. Instead, the relativist states that the
morality of abortion, will depend on the circumstances of the particular case.
Relativistic morality leads to legal positivism, the theory under which law
becomes wholly a question of power and there is no moral limit to what the
human law can do.
St. Thomas affirms that in order that "what is commanded may have the
nature of law, it needs to be in accord with some rule of reason."'" If the
human law acts contrary to reason as found in the eternal law, revelation,
and the natural law, that human "law" is not a law at all but rather an act of
violence.43 Although there is an element of will in any law, the positivist
denies that the human law must be in accord with reason. Instead, he
reduces human law to an act of will by the one in command. This can be
seen in Byrn v. New York City Health and Hospital Corp.', where the high-
est court of that state upheld the liberal New York abortion law of 1970.
The court first found that the unborn child, "upon conception.. .is human,
if only because it may not be characterized as not human, and it is unques-
tionably alive.",45 But then the court asked "whether a human entity, con-
ceived but not yet born, is and must be recognized as a person in the law."46
The court's answer was that:
[w]hether the law should accord legal personality is a policy ques-
tion which in most instances devolves on the Legislature, subject
again of course to the Constitution as it has been "legally" ren-
dered. That the legislative action may be wise or unwise, even un-
just and violative of principles beyond the law, does not change the
legal issue or how it is to be resolved. The point is that it is a
policy determination whether legal personality should attach and
not a question of biological or "natural" correspondence.47
In support of this conclusion, the New York Court of Appeals cited Hans
Kelsen, "[a]ny content whatsoever can be legal; there is no human behavior
42. T. AQUINAS SUMMA THEOLOGICA, part II, Q. 90. Art. 1 (1915).
43. Id. at Q. 90. Art. 4.
44. 31 N.Y.2d 194, 286 N.E.2d 887 (1972), appeal dismissed, 410 U.S. 949, reh'g denied,
411 U.S. 940 (1973).
45. Id. at 199, 286 N.E.2d at 888.
46. Id. at 200, 286 N.E.2d at 889.
47. Id. at 201, 286 N.E.2d at 889.
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which could not function as the content of a legal norm."' I8 For a law to be
valid, it is necessary only that "it has been constituted in a particular fash-
ion, born of a definite procedure and a definite rule. Law is valid only as
positive law, that is, statute (constituted) law."49 The Supreme Court, after
deciding Roe v. Wade, dismissed the appeal of the Byrn case.5" Roe v. Wade
is based on the same principle as Byrn.
Roe v. Wade reflected a fundamental change in American law. With re-
spect to the most basic of all issues, the right to life, Roe adopted the princi-
ples of legal positivism which had been discredited by the German
experience of 1933 to 1945. Even prior to World War I, positivism was
dominant in Germany. "According to this new positivistic jurisprudence,
the legislator, and he alone, creates the law. Everything prior to legislative
enactment is at best custom, but never true law. Thus, law and right become
wholly identified, and bare legality takes the place of substantive justice as an
ideal."'" Under the Nuremberg Laws of 1935, the Nazis deprived Jews of
their citizenship and political rights, in effect depriving them of per-
sonhood.52 Later, they were deprived of their lives as well, pursuant to the
euthanasia program designed to achieve "the destruction of life devoid of
value." 3 The only significant difference between abortion and euthanasia,
therefore, is the age and location of the victim.
Gustav Radbruch noted that positivism "disarmed the German jurists
against law of an arbitrary and criminal content. '54 "Law is the quest for
justice."55 If enactments deny people their rights, "they are null and void;
the people are not to obey them, and jurists must find the courage to brand
them unlawful." 56
Of course, application by the courts of a higher standard of law would be
appropriate only in extreme cases. As a West German court said in 1947,
"[w]henever the conflict between an enacted law and true justice reaches
unendurable proportions, the enacted law must yield to justice, and be con-
sidered a lawless law."" There are some objective moral norms, however, of
48. Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law, Part II, 51 L.Q. REV. 517, 517-18 (1935).
49. Id. at 518.
50. 410 U.S. 949 (1973).
51. Von Hippel, The Role of Natural Law in the Legal Decisions of the Federal German
Republic, 4 NAT. L. F. 106, 107 (1959).
52. See H. ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM 39 (1964).
53. See generally F. WERTHAM, A SIGN FOR CAIN 153 (1969).
54. See Rommen, Natural Law in Decisions of the Federal Supreme Court and of the Con-
stitutional Courts in Germany, 4 NAT. L.F. 1, 11 n.26 (1959).
55. Von Hippel, supra note 51, at I10.
56. Id. at I11.
57. Id.
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such importance that they should be held to override a contrary enacted law
or even the Constitution itself. Racial equality before the law, I suggest, is
such a norm. Thus the preferable response to school segregation in Brown v.
Board of Education 58 was not to distort the intent of the fourteenth amend-
ment so as to rest the outlawing of de jure segregation on a merely positivis-
tic basis (i.e., that it is against the intent of the fourteenth amendment).
Rather, the response should have been that, whether or not the fourteenth
amendment was intended to permit it, racial segregation in public facilities is
unjust and is unlawful.
Another basic principle of natural law that should govern the human law
is that, in a system where personhood is the condition of rights, there is an
inseparable connection between humanity and personhood. A related prin-
ciple is that law cannot justly sanction the execution of the innocent. This
follows from the personhood principle since, as recognized by Justice Ste-
vens in Thornburgh, to the extent that an individual is, as an innocent
human being, is subject to death at the discretion of others, that individual is
a non-person. This principle must apply to all human beings, including the
unborn. And if one is somehow in doubt as to the humanity of the unborn
child, he is bound, at least, to give the benefit of the doubt to life rather than
death. In fact, there is no genuine doubt about the fact that human life
begins at conception. When Louise Brown, the first test-tube baby, was born
in 1978, the whole world knew when her life began: at the moment of
conception. 59
Roe v. Wade presented the conflict between the higher law and positivism
because Roe placed no significant restrictions on its authorization of the exe-
cution of members of a class of innocent human beings. But even if Roe
were to be modified so as to permit, but not require, the states to restrict or
even prohibit abortion in some situations, that modification could be ac-
cepted only by conceding the legitimacy of the basic premises of legal posi-
tivism. The natural law does not forbid merely the unrestricted murder of
the innocent, or such murder without the sanction of a legislature. Rather,
it forbids murder absolutely. It would not have been a sound response to the
Holocaust to say that each locality in Germany should have the right to
choose whether to have its own death camp, or to argue that only those Jews
who are over sixty-five should be killed. The issue is not whether an inno-
cent human being can be killed without restriction, but whether he can be
legally killed at all. Even if the Supreme Court makes a mid-course correc-
58. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
59. N.Y. Times, July 27, 1978, at 1, col. 2.
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tion so as to restrict, but not forbid, such killing, it will have reaffirmed its
adoption of the Nazi jurisprudence.
The experience of Nuremberg confirms the dictate of the natural law that
the human law can never validly authorize the intentional execution of the
innocent. It is no answer to say that we will allow only abortion on a limited
basis, or that we will allow it only in states where the legislature so decides.
That is the positivist position. The pre-1973 exception for the life of the
mother was understandable in the context of medical knowledge of the time,
and statutes were adopted as to cases where the mother's life was apparently
or actually threatened, and where the principles of self-defense were under-
standably-but, I suggest, wrongly brought into play. I disagree with that
exception. But its inclusion in pre-1973 laws did not reflect a conscious
choice to sacrifice an innocent life for a lesser interest than life itself, and
therefore did not involve the subjection of the innocent to death for conven-
ience. Such killing for convenience is the issue today, together with present-
ing the issue between positivism and the natural law of God.
Abortion is also a symptom of the acceptance by American society of the
contraceptive ethic. Abortion is the taking of life while contraception is the
prevention of life. Nevertheless, there is a relation between the two which we
tend to overlook.
As Pope Paul VI explained in his 1968 encyclical, Humanae Vitae,60 con-
traception is always objectively wrong because it involves the willful separa-
tion of the two intrinsic aspects of sex - the unitive and the procreative. 6'
Contraception is the exercise of the procreative function while taking a posi-
tive step to prevent a baby. Abortion shares this defect, denying that sex has
any inherent relation to life. The contraceptive mentality is a mentality of
not wanting babies. It tends to reduce objections to abortion an emotional
or esthetic level. On the practical level, too, abortion is a "fail-safe" contra-
ceptive. A necessary back-up technique for a society which regards new life
not as a gift in trust from God but as a nuisance. Thus, permissive abortion
is essential to a contraceptive society.
The acceptance of contraception arises from a lack of trust in the provi-
dence of God, and from a refusal to acknowledge that the law of God is the
criterion for the origin of life. In his 1981 Apostolic Exhortation, Familiaris
Consortio, Pope John Paul II said:
[w]hen couples, by means of recourse to contraception, separate
these two meanings that God the Creator has inscribed in the being
60. POPE PAUL VI, HUMANAE VITAL, ON THE REGULATION OF BIRTH (U.S. Catholic
Conference 1968).
61. Id. at 7-9.
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of man and woman and in the dynamism of their sexual commu-
nion, they act as 'arbiters' of the divine plan and they "manipu-
late" and degrade human sexuality and with it themselves and
their married partner by altering its value of 'total' self-giving.
Thus, the innate language that expresses the total reciprocal self-
giving of husband and wife is overlaid, through contraception, by
an objectively contradictory language, namely, that of not giving
oneself totally to the other. This leads not only to a positive refusal
to be open to life, but also to a falsification of the inner truth of
conjugal love, which is called upon to give itself in personal
totality.62
As with abortion, the connection between contraception and euthanasia
arises from the question of dominion: who is in charge, man or God? In
contraception, man assumes divine prerogative of deciding whether and
when life shall begin. In euthanasia, he assumes the role of deciding when it
shall end. This point of dominion was emphasized by Pope John Paul II who
stated:
[a]t the origin of every human person there is a creative act of God.
No man comes into existence by chance; he is always the object of
God's creative love. For this fundamental truth of faith and reason
it follows that the procreative capacity, inscribed in human sexual-
ity, is - in its deepest truth - a cooperation with God's creative
power.
It also follows that men and women are not the arbiters, are not
the masters of this same capacity, called as they are, in it and
through it, to be participants in God's creative decision. When,
therefore, through contraception, married couples remove from the
exercise of their conjugal sexuality its potential procreative capac-
ity, they claim a power which belongs solely to God: the power to
decide, in a final analysis, the coming into existence of a human
person. They assume the qualification not of being cooperators in
God's creative power, but the ultimate depositaries of the source of
human life.
In this perspective, contraception is being judged, objectively, so
profoundly unlawful as never to be, for any reason, justified. To
think or to say the contrary is equal to maintaining that in human
life situations may arise in which it is lawful not to recognize God
as God.63
The practice of contraception is also based on the premise that there is
62. Pope John Paul 11, Apostolic Exhortation, Familiaris Consortio, reprinted in M.J.
WRENN, POPE JOHN PAUL II AND THE FAMILY 29 (Franciscan Herald Press 1983).
63. Pope John Paul II, Heroism in Marriage 28 THE POPE SPEAKS 356-57 (1983).
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such a thing as a life not worth living. In a secular, relativist, contraceptive
society, this premise will be applied to the unfit and burdensome of all ages.
If, through contraception, man makes himself, rather than God, the arbiter
of the beginning of life, it ought not to be surprising that he will assume the
same role with respect to the end of life.
A human life amendment or a human life statute would provide only lim-
ited protection to existing human life and, therefore, would not restrict con-
traception. But since abortion and euthanasia are an outgrowth of the
contraceptive ethic, the chance of enacting effective protections of the right
to life is diminished by the contraceptive consensus.
The general acceptance of the morality of contraception is a fundamental
cause, with secularism and relativism, of other social problems in addition to
abortion and euthanasia. Some examples of such social ills are as follows:
Pornography. Like contraception, pornography is the separation of
sex from life and the reduction of sex to an exercise in self-gratifica-
tion. In the process, the woman becomes an object rather than a
person. One characteristic of contraception is its tendency to de-
personalize the woman. Pope Paul in Humanae Vitae, warned that
contraception would cause women to be viewed as sex objects, that
"man, growing used to the employment of anti-conceptive prac-
tices, may finally lose respect for the woman, and no longer caring
for her physical and psychological equilibrium, may come to the
point of considering her as a mere instrument of selfish enjoyment,
and no longer as his respected and beloved companion. ' 64
Homosexual activity. The legitimization of homosexual activity is
predictable in a contraceptive society which cannot say that homo-
sexual relations are objectively wrong without condemning itself.
Instead, homosexual living must be regarded as an alternate' lifes-
tyle - which is what it is - if sex has no inherent relation to
reproduction. On the contrary, a society in which it makes no dif-
ference whether boys marry girls or other boys is not only on the
road to extinction; it is clinically insane.65
In vitro fertilization. Contraception is the taking of the unitive
without the procreative. In vitro fertilization is the reverse. The
teaching Church has warned against this as a perversion which
treats man as a laboratory specimen. The process ordinarily in-
volves the fertilization of several eggs; only the best ones are im-
planted in the womb. The rest may be used for experimentation;
64. W. STANMEYER, THE SEDUCTION OF SOCIETY: PORNOGRAPHY AND ITS IMPACT ON
AMERICAN LIFE (1984); C. RICE, BEYOND ABORTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE
SECULAR STATE (1979).'
65. CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, DECLARATION ON CERTAIN
QUESTIONS CONCERNING SEXUAL ETHICS No. 8, Dec. 29, 1975.
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frozen for later implantation in the mother or (it has been sug-
gested) in other would-be 'mothers' to whom the embryo would be
given or sold; preserved (according to another suggestion) for spare
parts for persons in need of new organs; or simply flushed down
the drain, which, of course, is miniaturized euthanasia.66
Teen-age promiscuity. In addition to the inducements offered by
imprudent sex education, the media and the availability of contra-
ception and abortion, one explanation for teenage promiscuity is
parental example. According to natural moral law and the Com-
mandments, sex is reserved for marriage; this is so because sex in-
herently has something to do with babies and the natural way to
raise children is in a monogamous, life-time marriage. But if chil-
dren see their parents, in their practice of contraception, behave as
if sex had no inherent relation to reproduction, it should not be
surprising if those children draw the conclusion that sex does not
have to be reserved for marriage.67
Divorce. The divorce rate soared during the years in which contra-
ception became practically universal and sterilization became the
most popular form of contraception. Almost one out of every two
marriages in the United States ends in divorce. In the natural or-
der of things, marriage is permanent because sex is intrinsically
related to reproduction and it is according to nature that children
be raised in a stable home with parents permanently united in mar-
riage. If sex and marriage are not intrinsically related to life, then
marriage loses its reason for permanence. It tends to become an
alliance for individual self-fulfillment - what Pope Paul called "the
juxtaposition'of two solitudes.",68 If marriage is merely "an associ-
ation of two individuals," as the Supreme Court says it is,69 it will
tend to be more binding than any other contract at will. No-fault
divorce is a predictable feature of a contraceptive society.
Child abuse. The refusal to accept responsibility for others and to
endure frustration is characteristic of the contraceptive mind. Ac-
cording to Dr. Edward Lenoski, director of pediatric emergency
services at Los Angeles County Hospital, ninety percent of the bat-
tered children in his six-year study were "planned pregnancies."
Since the introduction of the contraceptive pill, child beating has
increased three-fold.7°
66. Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith, INSTRUCTION ON RESPECT FOR HUMAN
LIFE IN ITS ORIGINS AND ON THE DIGNITY OF PROCREATION (pts. 2 & 3, Mar. 10, 1987).
67. Id. No. 7.
68. Conversations with Pope Paul VI, MCCALL'S Oct. 1967, at 137-38.
69. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
70. L.A. Times, Oct. 12, 1970, § 4, at 11, col. 4; see also Ney, Relationship Between Abor-
tion and Child Abuse, 24 CANADIAN J. PSYCHIATRY 610 (1978).
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The American people seem to favor at least some legalized abortion and
some euthanasia. A New York Times poll indicated in 1986 that forty per-
cent of the population believe that abortion should be legal as it is now; fifty-
six percent ,do not approve of the present legal situation, but only sixteen
percent of these believe abortion should be illegal in all cases, while forty
percent believe it should be legal in cases where needed to save the life of the
mother or where the baby was conceived as a result of rape or incest.7
Although no clear majority favors either total allowance or total prohibition
of abortion, there does appear to be a consensus in favor of at least some
legalized abortion.
Legalized euthanasia logically follows and practically upon legalized abor-
tion. Americans generally favor euthanasia, at least in some situations. For
example, a Media General-Associated Press poll in 1986 showed that sixty-
eight percent of the 1,532 respondents said that people dying of incurable
illnesses should be allowed to end their lives; sixty-eight percent believed
doctors should be allowed to turn off machines keeping irreversibly coma-
tose patients alive; and sixty-one percent believed parents should be allowed
to withhold life saving surgery from severely-retarded infants.72
It is not surprising that a secularist, relativist society permeated with the
contraceptive ethic will accept abortion and euthanasia at least in some situ-
ations, especially in light of the pressures generated by the aging of the
American population. A fertility rate of 2.1 is necessary to ensure the main-
tenance of a nation's population level through the replacement of successive
generations. The fertility rate of the United States has been at or around 1.8
for at least ten years. As of 1982, there were 5.4 people of working age for
every person aged sixty-five and over; by 2050 the ratio will be 2.6 to 1.
73
The fastest growing age group in the population of the United States consists
of those eighty-five and over. There are about 2.5 million in this group today
but by the year 2000 there will be 5.4 million or 2 percent of the population;
by 2050 there will be 16 million. Although those eighty-five and over are
now less than one percent of the population they will fill more than twenty
percent of the beds in nursing homes.7 4 One incurs the majority of their life-
time medical expenses in the final year of life. To maintain the current level.
of services for the elderly would require opening a new 100-bed nursing
home everyday of every year until the year 2000.7 ' Among persons over
71. N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1986, § 4, at 22, col. 4.
72. Lafayette, Ind., J. & Courier, Apr. 14, 1985, at A14, col. 1.
73. N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1982, at A19, col. 1. See generally P. ZOPF JR., AMERICA'S
OLDER POPULATION (1986).
74. N.Y. Times, May 26, 1984, at L28, col. 5; So. Bend Trib., Oct. 14, 1984, at 46, col. 3.
75. AM. MED. NEWS, April 13, 1984, at 1.
1988]
Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy
sixty-five, in-patient days in the hospital, per 1,000 population, are five times
those of persons under sixty-five. It costs 3.5 times as much to treat a pa-
tient over sixty-five as one who is under sixty-five. The cost of treating a
patient seventy-five or older is seven times the cost of treating a patient
under sixty-five.76
Statistics could be multiplied to show the increasing burden on the
younger generation to support the increasing older generation. It should not
be surprising that the provision of a "merciful release" to some of the elderly
and disabled would appeal to a hard-pressed younger middle class as part of
the solution to this problem. Nor should it be surprising that a positivist
legal system would develop principles to accommodate this tendency.
Recent judicial decisions have treated food and water, whether adminis-
tered orally or artificially, as treatment which a patient may refuse. If a
patient is incompetent, through infancy, senility, coma or otherwise, the
trend in American judicial decisions is to allow the termination of life sup-
port systems and other forms of treatment on a "quality of life" basis. The
"quality of life" theory compares the benefits of continuing the patient's life
with the burdens of sustaining it. Burdens are judged as either ordinary or
extraordinary. A further trend is to regard nutrition and hydration, i.e.,
food and water, as forms of treatment that may be refused by a competent
patient, or withheld from an incompetent patient, on a similar "quality of
life" basis.77
"[R]ecent surveys have suggested that a majority of practicing doctors
now approve of passive euthanasia and believe that it is being practiced by
members of the profession." 78 The American Medical Association Council
on Ethical and Judicial Affairs enunciated a new policy in March, 1986, to
allow the withholding of food and water from comatose patients:
[e]ven if death is not imminent but a patient's coma is irreversible
and there are adequate safeguards to confirm the accuracy of the
diagnosis and with the concurrence of those who have responsibil-
ity for the care of the patient, it is not unethical to discontinue all
means of life prolonging medical treatment.
Life-prolonging medical treatment includes medication and arti-
ficially or technologically supplied respiration, nutrition, or hydra-
tion. In treating a terminally ill or irreversibly comatose patient,
76. The Hospital Cost Equation, SOUTHEASTERN HOSPITAL CONFERENCE, Sept. 1983.
77. Compare Dresser & Boisaubin, Ethics, Law and Nutritional Support, 145 ARCHIVES
INTERNAL MED. 122 (1985) and Meyers, Legal Aspects of Withdrawing Nourishment from an
Incurably Ill Patient, 145 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 125 (1985), with Sigler & Weisbard,
Against the Emerging Stream, 145 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 129 (1985).
78. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 337, 486 A.2d 1209, 1225 (1985).
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the physician should determine whether the benefits of treatment
outweigh its burdens. At all times, the dignity of the patient
should be maintained.79
The trend of the law can be seen from the leading case of In re Conroy,80
which answered the question of whether:
life-sustaining treatment may be withheld or withdrawn from an
elderly nursing-home resident who is suffering from serious and
permanent mental and physical impairments, who will probably
die within approximately one year even with the treatment, and
who, though formerly competent, is now incompetent to make de-
cisions about her life-sustaining treatment and unlikely to regain
such competence.81
The court held that "life-sustaining treatment may be withheld or with-
drawn from an incompetent patient when it is clear that the particular pa-
tient would have refused the treatment under the circumstances involved."82
With respect to "persons who never clearly expressed their desires about life-
sustaining treatment but who are now suffering a prolonged and painful
death," 3 the court held that life-sustaining treatment may be withheld "if
either of two best interests' tests - a limited-objective or a pure-objective test
- is satisfied."8 4
Under the limited-objective test, life-sustaining treatment may be
withheld or withdrawn from a patient in Claire Conroy's situation
when there is some trustworthy evidence that the patient would
have refused the treatment, and the decision-maker is satisfied that
it is clear that the burden of the patient's continued life with the
treatment outweigh the benefits of that life for him . . .. In the
absence of trustworthy evidence, or indeed any evidence at all, that
the patient would have declined the treatment, life-sustaining treat-
ment may still be withheld or withdrawn from a formerly compe-
tent person like Claire Conroy if a third, pure-objective test is
satisfied. Under that test, as under the limited-objective test, the
net burdens of the patient's life with the treatment should clearly
and markedly outweigh the benefits that the patient derives from
life. 85
The court added the following qualification:
79. The AMA Opinion on Withholding Food and Water, AM. MED. NEWS, Mar. 28, 1986,
at 8.
80. Id..
81. Id. at 342-43, 486 A.2d at 1219-20.
82. Id. at 360, 486 A.2d at 1229.
83. Id. at 364, 486 A.2d at 1231.
84. Id. at 365, 486 A.2d at 1232.
85. Id. at 365-66, 486 A.2d at 1232.
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[a]lthough we are condoning a restricted evaluation of the nature
of a patient's life in terms of pain, suffering, and possible enjoyment
under the limited-objective and pure-objective tests, we expressly
decline to authorize decision-making based on assessments of the
personal worth or social utility of another's life, or the value of that
life to others. We do not believe that it would be appropriate for a
court to designate a person with the authority to determine that
someone else's life is not worth living simply because, to that per-
son, the patient's quality of life or value to society seems
negligible.86
Despite this disclaimer, the court authorized a "quality of life" determina-
tion based on the decision maker's evaluation of the "net burdens" and
"benefits" of the patient's life.87 In that evaluation, "the primary focus
should be the patient's desires and experience of pain and enjoyment."88
Clearly, this was a judgment as to the "quality" of Claire Conroy's life.
The court, in dictum, commented that, "the line between active and pas-
sive conduct in the context of medical decisions is far too nebulous to consti-
tute a principled basis for decision-making."89 The court also rejected the
distinction "between the termination of artificial feedings and the termina-
tion of other forms of life-sustaining medical treatment."90
The starvation of a patient whose life is seen as more of a burden than a
benefit is an aspect of depersonalization. And it is supported by the theory
of legalized abortion. Peter Singer, who concedes that the right-to-life move-
ment is correct in arguing that the unborn child should have the same right
to life as a newborn infant, argues that both should be equally considered to
have no right to life at all. Singer criticizes "speciesism," which is prejudice
in favor of persons belonging to the species, homo sapiens, just as racism is
prejudice in favor of persons of a particular race. Singer defines a person as
"a rational and self-conscious being."91 Chimpanzees, whales, dolphins,
dogs and cats can make the personhood cut, according to Singer, while new-
born infants and retarded humans do not even make the travelling squad.
We should reject the doctrine that places the lives of members of
our species above the lives of members of other species. Some
members of other species are persons; some members of our own
species are not. No objective assessment can give greater value to
the lives of members of our species who are not persons than to the
86. Id. at 367, 486 A.2d at 1232-33.
87. Id. at 365, 486 A.2d at 1232.
88. Id. at 369, 486 A.2d at 1233.
89. Id. at 370, 486 A.2d at 1234.
90. Id. at 372, 486 A.2d at 1235.
91. P. SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS 76 (1979).
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lives of members of other species who are. On the contrary, as we
have seen there are strong arguments for placing the lives of per-
sons above the lives of non-persons. So it seems that killing, say, a
chimpanzee is worse than the killing of a gravely defective human
who is not a person.92
"We can no longer base our ethics," says Singer, "on the idea that human
beings are a special form of creation, made in the image of God, singled out
from all other animals, and alone possessing an immortal soul." 93
The legal theories and mechanisms are in place for the control of the prob-
lem of caring for the American aged and unfit. Dr. Leo Alexander, who
wrote the seminal analysis of the euthanasia program in the Third Reich, 94
observed in 1984, with respect to the American situation, that "[i]t is much
like Germany in the 20's and 30's - the barriers against killing are being
removed." 95
The point of these remarks is to argue that the apparently impending par-
tial retreat from Roe v. Wade will only aggravate the problem. The estab-
lishment of a states' rights solution will confirm the corruption of American
law through the acceptance of the depersonalization of innocent human be-
ings. It will ultimately increase the toll of innocent victims of all ages. Fur-
thermore, it will obscure the reality that no solution to the right-to-life issue
can be found apart from a repudiation of secularism, relativism and the con-
traceptive ethic, that is, apart from a national return to the law of God.
92. Id. at 97.
93. Singer, Sanctity of Life or Quality of Life?, PEDIATRICS, July, 1986, at 128-29.
94. Alexander, Medical Science Under Dictatorship, 241 NEw ENG. J. MED. 39 (1949).
95. Stanton, The New Untermenschen, 11 HUMAN LIFE REv. 77, 82 (1985).
1988]

